

Standard Type II systems engineering approach	INCOS	E
<ul> <li>Following the process (sort of), ignoring the problem</li> <li>Focusing on wrong things</li> <li>Focusing on easy things</li> <li>Not tackling the hard questions</li> <li>Building in excessive complexity</li> <li>Not grounded in research         <ul> <li>See lack of citations in GRCSE</li> <li>Been there done that, Kasser-Hitchins Fellows effort, 2008</li> </ul> </li> <li>Inward looking         <ul> <li>Limited to functional perspective, ignores operational and temporal</li> <li>Typical engineering partial solution</li> </ul> </li> <li>Doomed to failure unless something changes         <ul> <li>Waste of time and resources</li> </ul> </li> </ul>		mr.
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
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
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



- "DoD recognizes that their own SE success depends on having a well-accepted robust SE BoK on which standard practice, certification, and workforce competency and education can be based"
  - (Art Pyster, Fellows Briefing, INCOSE Singapore, 2009
- > How can it be a **well-accepted robust SE BoK** without answering the following questions?
- 1. Why is there no universal agreed-to definition of SE?
- 2. Why are there differing views on nature of SE?
- 3. Why are there dichotomies? – SOS and complex systems
  - In general, Defense has problems, industry copes
- 4. Why does SE work well sometimes?
- 5. Why does SE fail miserably (and expensively) other times?
- 6. Why is there no widely accepted body of knowledge?


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




































SE Categories	MIL-STD- 499[C]	ANSI/ EIA 632	IEEE- 1220	СММІ	ISO-15288
Conceptualizing problem and Iternative solutions	No	No	No	No	No
lission/purpose definition	No	No			$\checkmark$
Requirements engineering			$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$
System architecting			$\checkmark$		
System implementation	No		No	K	
Fechnical analysis			$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	
echnical management/ eadership		$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$		
erification & validation			$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	







Ρ	Poorly practiced -2 but need not be										
	Cost and Schedule Outcomes	Sorted by Percent Percent cost growth®	of Product Developn Schedule growth, in months	nent Remaining Percent of development remaining							
	Programs Aerial Common Sensor	45%	24	85%							
	Future Combat System	48%	48	78%							
Г	Joint Strike Fighter	30%	23	60%							
/-	Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle C-130 Avionics Modernization	61%	48	49%							
	Program	122%	Delays anticipated	Undetermined							
	Global Hawk (RQ-4B)	166%	Delays anticipated	Undetermined							
Sources: DOD (data); GAO (analysis and presentation). <sup>a</sup> Cost growth is expressed as the percent change in program development cost estimates in 2005 base year dollars.  Data from GAO Report 06-368, 2006											
Bragging a little here: JSF overrun predicted in Kasser J.E., "Writing Requirements for Flexible Systems", Proceedings of the INCOSE-UK Spring Symposium, May 2001.											
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